The Russian economy faces serious challenges when it comes to such issues as legitimacy of property and protection of property rights. This paper considers institutional aspects of raiding, including the role of Commercial Arbitration Courts and bankruptcy procedures in Russia. It concludes that raiding in Russia has a predatory character not because raiders prey on the weakest, failing, bankrupting businesses, but because they attack healthy and profitable enterprises, firms in temporary financial distress. Raiders use unclear ownership structure of attractive firms and buy necessary decisions from corrupt bureaucrats instead of waiting for a financial crisis to come.
agents. Is it true that raiders in Russia act not only in their own best interest, but also to the benefit of the economic system overall? Do raiders strengthen the national economy by weeding out weak firms? Do raiders serve as "market cleaners," especially after the crisis? This paper considers institutional aspects of raiding, including, the role of commercial arbitration courts and bankruptcy procedures in Russia.
Bankruptcy
The issue of raiding in Russia and problems directly related to raiding is addressed in the works of Barnes (2003 Barnes ( , 2006 Barnes ( , 2007 , Firestone (2008) , Frye (2000 Frye ( , 2002 , Kireev (2007) , Osipian (2010 Osipian ( , 2011 , Volkov (2004a Volkov ( , 2004b Volkov ( , 2004c , and Woodruff (2004 Woodruff ( , 2005 . Raiding in Russia differs significantly from what is perceived to be raiding in the western world. Raiders use a wide variety of tools and activities, including illegal ones, such as pressuring minor shareholders, bribing managers and bureaucrats, creating artificial debts, fraudulent production of charter documents, deeds and titles of property, and violent storming of enterprises with the help of private security firms and freelance storm-troopers. Official sources, including the law enforcement agencies, estimate the total number of raiding cases in Russia to be several dozen, or at most a few hundred annually, while some expert estimates speculate as many as hundreds and even thousands. Because there is no clear legal definition of raiding and due to the latent character of many raiding cases, it is difficult to estimate the real scale of the problem, including in the aftermath of the 2008 crisis. Nevertheless, trends with bankruptcies may give some idea about the character and dynamics of the post-crisis raiding in Russia.
Bankruptcy, intentional or staged, is one of the favorite methods of raiding the property of enterprises. Creditors demand courts recognize their debtors as insolvent or bankrupt in order to gain control over their property. Raiders buy debts from creditors and then present those debts in commercial arbitrage courts against target enterprises. Bankruptcy may be used not only by outsiders, but by insiders as well, including the top management of the targeted enterprise. Top management can use bankruptcy for a company's restructuring, changing the property structure, or appropriation of its most valuable production units and assets. Commercial arbitration courts consider bankruptcy cases and thus may be especially useful for raiders. The court bailiff services execute the court orders. We will turn to some data on court decisions and other actions regarding bankruptcies in Russia over the last two decades. The general review of the existing picture in the sphere of bankruptcies will allow a clear view of the raiders' opportunities to use the court system for hostile takeovers through bankruptcies and bankruptcy related procedures.
Role of Commercial Arbitration Courts
Arbitration court is an institutionalization of state power regarding commercial dispute resolution. Pistor and Xu (2004, 170-171) offer the following brief description of the legislature's and court's role:
Legislatures are agents that make law ex ante, but typically do not exercise any law enforcement powers. Courts usually make law ex post, that is, after the critical facts of a case have been revealed. However, case law once made also has ex ante implications for actions taken in the future. Courts also exercise law enforcement powers. More importantly, courts enforce law only after a party other than the court brings an action. This party may be the victim, or it may be a state agent, such as a prosecutor or administrative agency. We therefore call courts reactive as opposed to proactive law enforcers. This design feature is crucial for courts to function as neutral arbiters. Radaev (2004, 108) notes that "capacities of formal litigation in contract enforcement with the assistance of arbitration courts and other third parties are limited. Russian entrepreneurs have to use methods of private contract enforcement including informal ways of settling disputes." McMillan and Woodruff (1999) and Woodruff (2004) also research the role of courts in arbitration, enforcement of contractual obligations, and establishing trust in the business environment. Commercial arbitration courts are intended to fill the existing gaps in commercial disputes and force criminal groups out of the business of arbitration. Volkov (2005) points out that the research of the demand for legal rights and the use of the court system, presented by the entrepreneurs, point to the growth in demand for services of the court system and an increase in the public trust in the court system among the business community. Over the last three years, 60 percent of companies settled their commercial disputes in commercial arbitration courts. The only sphere where the entrepreneurs do not see any perspective in defending their rights in courts is their commercial disputes with the state (state organizations). And if the general tendency is that a fair court decision is possible in commercial disputes between entrepreneurs, in disputes with the state or with use of the court system by the state institutions the right of the stronger one prevails. The specifics of the new strategic situation is in strengthening the state positions without any significant restrictions or counterbalances, which work in favor of interests of particular groups of state bureaucrats. Accordingly, the character of law application reflects this new situation. Zon (2008, 89) suggests that "there has been some progress and increasingly citizens and enterprises turn to the court for dispute solutions." The organizational structure of the Commercial Arbitration Court system in the RF rests on four levels that form a strict and clear hierarchy. The procedures are improved over time in both content and technical abilities, including the electronic justice system.
Work of Commercial Arbitration Courts
Data on 
Bankruptcy Dynamics in Russia
Major indicators of bankruptcy cases considered in the commercial arbitrage courts in Russia from 1998 through 2010 do not point to any clear linear tendencies, and nevertheless a general tendency to an increase in bankruptcy cases is visible. The number of bankruptcy claims filed in commercial arbitrage courts against debtors by The first time the external management procedure appeared in Russia was in Presidential Order №623: "On the supporting measures for insolvent state enterprises (bankrupts) and application of special procedures," issued on June 14, 1992. Since that time, the external management procedure has undergone significant changes. For instance, the request for the implementation of external management procedures can be satisfied by the commercial arbitration court in a bankruptcy case only when there is a high possibility of financial recovery. The institution of external management procedures oftentimes represents a threat to lawful owners of enterprises, even if their unpaid debt is not that high. A commercial arbitration court considers a case filed by a raider company and appoints a temporary manager. The temporary manager chairs the meeting of all the enterprise's creditors and suggests the candidacy of an external manager. After being appointed by the court, the external manager gains full managerial control over the enterprise, which is especially important for raiders.
As follows from the data, financial recovery and external management procedures are not widespread in Russian commercial arbitration bankruptcy practices. Apparently these procedures did not find much support among entrepreneurs, especially as far as the imposition of external managers is concerned. For instance, the Achinski glinozemny mineral plant was taken over by the "Alfa" financial industrial group, only one year after it was transferred under external management. In this case, the external manager represented "Alfa" group. "Alfa" group is allegedly one of the major players on the corporate raiding market in Russia.
Bankruptcy cases considered in the commercial arbitration court system in the RF include auctioning and liquidation procedures. The total number of bankruptcy rulings and proceeding to auction increased from 1,896 in 1998, to 16,009 
Conclusion
Each financial crisis is unique, and so are its consequences, including in terms of bankruptcies, external management, auctioning and liquidation dynamics. The hunt for state and municipal property, so obvious after the crisis of 1998, is not nearly as obvious after the crisis of 2008. This may be in part due to the lesser number of state and municipal enterprises left for potential raiding after the mass privatization of the 1990s. After the crisis of 2008, the number of bankruptcy claims completed and the number of actual bankruptcies increased from 2008 to 2010, 16 and 55 percentage points, respectively. This increase is not nearly as significant, as it was after the 1998 crisis. The number of cases that warranted external management procedures, frequently used by raiders in so-called bankruptcy schemes, declined to 579 in 2008, but starting in 2009, this number increased to 604, and then to 908 in 2010, and 839 in the first half of 2011, and may well reach 2,000 cases by the end of 2011.
Raiding in Russia has a predatory character not because raiders prey on the weakest, failing, bankrupting businesses, but because they attack healthy and profitable enterprises, firms in temporary financial distress. Raiders use the unclear ownership structure of attractive firms or simply buy necessary decisions from corrupt bureaucrats. Is raiding in Russia dependent on the crisis then? The answer is yes, but only to a certain extent. Financial crises may be helpful to raiders, but raiders are not likely to wait for a financial crisis to come in order to act using external management and bankruptcy schemes. Instead, Russian raiders target domestic and foreign companies with the combination of legal, quasi-legal, and illegal tools in times of crisis and in times of economic prosperity. Predatory raiding in Russia is an open challenge to the newly emerged market institutions and property rights. It is linked to institutions in at least two major ways. First, it undermines private property rights and deprives owners of their enterprises. And, second, raiders use state institutions called to regulate business transactions, such as commercial arbitration courts and bankruptcy, external management, auctioning and liquidation, in order to advance their aggressive agenda of hostile takeovers.
